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Lahm: Buying a Digital Download ?

BUYING A DIGITAL DOWNLOAD? YOU MAY NOT OWN
THE COPY YOU PURCHASE
Jennifer Lahm*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent Ninth Circuit decisions in which the court examined
the traditional notion that ownership of an authorized copy of a copyrighted work transfers when that copy is first publicly distributed by
the copyright owner may have oppressive effects for consumers of
digital downloads. Historically, upon this first distribution, also
known as a first sale,1 the owner of the copy is able to raise certain
affirmative defenses to copyright infringement.2 However, complica*

Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2012, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S.,
cum laude, Ithaca College. Special thanks to Professor Rena Seplowitz and the members of
the Touro Law Review for their advice and assistance, and to my family and Justin for their
patience and support during the last three years.
1
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2011) (“Under
[§ 106(3)] the copyright owner would have the right to control the first public distribution of
an authorized copy or phonorecord of his work, whether by sale, gift, loan, or some rental or
lease arrangement.”); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977) (referring
to the distribution as a “first sale”).
2
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a) (2006) (first sale doctrine), 117(a) (2006) (essential step defense). The first sale doctrine states, in pertinent part,
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (emphasis added). The essential step defense states, in pertinent part,
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine
and that it is used in no other manner, or
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tions arise when restrictive contractual agreements accompany the
copy, because these agreements may place enough constraints upon a
consumer‟s use that he may not own the purchased copy. For
example, a consumer who purchases digital downloads often does so
through an online music store and must agree to the store‟s terms;
however he generally does not receive an express transfer of title to
the copy3 purchased.4 Moreover, by agreeing to the store‟s terms, the
consumer likely agrees to terms that limit ownership rights granted
by the Copyright Act, effectively becoming a licensee rather than an
owner of a copy. Because licenses and contracts play such an active
role in the purchase of digital downloads, consumers of these downloads probably do not own the copies they purchase and are therefore
not protected by the ownership rights under the Copyright Act. This
Comment will demonstrate that consumers of digital downloads need
additional protection as possessors of copies.

(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
3
For purposes of this Comment, all material objects, such as phonorecords, which embody the copyright, such as sound recordings, will often be referred to as “copies.” See
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.03[C] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2010) (hereinafter NIMMER & NIMMER) (“The same distinction is made as between „sound recordings,‟ which are works of authorship, and „phonorecords,‟ which merely
embody such sounds.”). A “phonorecord” is not included in the definition of “copy,” which
strictly refers to the material object embodying a copyrighted work that is not a sound recording. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra. However, in
many instances, the two are treated the same under the Copyright Act, see id. (referring to
the distinction as an “unnecessary complexity”), and thus, will collectively often be referred
to as “copies.” Any relevant distinctions will be noted as necessary.
4
See Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-riding Role of Contract, 51
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1311 (2011) (“In the digital era, all of the traditional content industries have moved to a mixed model of distribution and many new industries only use digital
distributions subject to license agreements.”); see, e.g., Software License Agreement for
iTunes, APPLE, http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/itunes.pdf (last updated Feb. 10, 2010)
(requiring that the consumer agree to the agreement in order to use the software); iTunes
Store Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html (last
updated June 21, 2010) (indicating that the agreement governs the consumer‟s use of the
iTunes music store to access digital content); Purchasing Music, iTunes Store Category
listed on iTunes A to Z, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/features/#purchasingmusic (last
visited Dec. 31, 2010) (describing the iTunes store and how consumers use it to purchase
music); see also Greg Raburn, Digital Content and the Repo Man, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 35, 49
(Winter 2011) (describing the similar effect the digital era is having on the distribution of
books, stating that, for example, the Terms of Use used for Amazon‟s Kindle “likely means
that Amazon does not consider an e-book to be covered by the first sale doctrine, and therefore views an e-book as more akin to software than an actual book”).
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In September 2010, the Ninth Circuit held in Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc.5 that the lawful possessor of authorized copies of a
computer software program did not own those copies.6 Rather, the
court found that the copyright owner granted a license to the possessor, as evidenced by a written agreement that provided for limited use
of the copies and restrictions on distribution and reproduction rights.7
Only months later, with respect to music recordings, the Ninth
Circuit in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto8 held that the possessor
of copies of promotional compact discs (“CDs”) did in fact own those
copies, despite the copyright owner‟s attempt to enforce licensing
language and use restrictions placed on the products‟ packaging.9
The court distinguished the CD recipients in UMG from the computer
program users in Vernor based on their respective relationships with
the copyright owners.10 Notwithstanding the attempt to create a licensing notice on the package,11 UMG did not control or formally
monitor the use or further transfer of the copies,12 whereas Autodesk
imposed and executed significant use and transfer restrictions.13
Moreover, UMG mailed the CDs without receiving such a request or
payment from the recipients;14 Autodesk typically received payment
for the software copies following the customers‟ requests for the program.15 As a result, the court in UMG limited the holding in Vernor
5
621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-1421, 2011 WL 4530222 (Oct. 3,
2011); see Christopher Barnett, Supreme Court Allows Pro-Autodesk Decision to Remain
Intact
in
Ninth
Circuit,
SOFTWARE
AUDIT
BLOG
(Oct.
2011),
http://www.scottandscottllp.com/main/Supreme_Court_Allows.aspx#page=1 (“The Supreme
Court‟s refusal to hear the case means that, at least in the Ninth Circuit, software publishers
like Autodesk may continue to seek injunctions and other remedies against those who attempt to distribute copies of a copyrighted software product without a license.”).
6
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
7
Id. (“We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy
where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly
restricts the user‟s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.
Applying our holding to Autodesk‟s [software license agreement], we conclude that [the
possessor] was a licensee rather than an owner of the copies . . . .”).
8
628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
9
Id. at 1180.
10
Id. at 1183.
11
The court noted that there was no evidence that the recipients accepted the alleged license agreement or its restrictions. Id. at 1182, 1183.
12
Id. at 1180, 1183.
13
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2010).
14
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180-81 (citing Unordered Merchandise Statute, 39 U.S.C. §
3009(a), (b) (2006)).
15
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1104.
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to software users because software users were in “a very different position from that held by the recipients of UMG‟s promotional CDs.”16
Although the Ninth Circuit must have believed that Vernor
and UMG were consistent with respect to the rules of law for computer programs and promotional CDs individually,17 the decisions,
when read broadly to apply beyond computer software and promotional CDs, left unanswered whether possessors of copies of digital
music downloads were owners or licensees. Arguably, those that
purchase digital downloads are not in a “very different position” from
the computer software users in Vernor, because music downloads are
often purchased and transmitted using computer software programs
subject to license agreements.18 Therefore, the distinctions drawn by
the Ninth Circuit to separate the recipient of a promotional CD from a
computer software user do not exist with a buyer of a digital download.19 Although similar to UMG in that the downloaded file is a
copy rather than software,20 the downloaded file ultimately more
closely resembles the software in Vernor because the copyright owner retains control through the use of a software program and software
agreement.21 While digital downloads do not fall perfectly within the
parameters of either case, Vernor seems more applicable due to the
existence of the software program and the use and transfer
restrictions placed upon possessors of the copies.22 Thus, digital
download consumers are arguably licensees under Vernor.
The distinction between an owner of a copy and a licensee of
the copyright who merely possesses a copy is important because an
owner of a copy is entitled to certain rights under the Copyright Act
(“the Copyright Act” or “the Act”).23 Furthering this distinction,
§ 202 of the Copyright Act creates a statutory division between the
16
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (“Th[e] formulation [from Vernor] . . . applies in terms to software users . . . .”).
17
The judicial panel was the same for both cases. Id. at 1177; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1103.
18
See supra note 4 (citing agreements used by Apple‟s iTunes).
19
See supra text accompanying notes 10-16 (noting that the court in UMG justified its
decision to find ownership based on: (1) the minimal level of control retained by the copyright owner and (2) the object‟s dissimilarities from software).
20
Compare NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E], with UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183.
21
Compare supra note 4, with Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12.
22
See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12 (describing the “significant” use and transfer restrictions placed on the software user).
23
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Vernor, 621 F.3d at
1107 (describing certain ownership rights that are “unavailable to those who are only licensed to use their copies of copyrighted works”).
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copyright and the object embodying it.24 An owner of a copy is able
to raise certain affirmative defenses to infringement claims, and such
ownership may be transferred separately from the copyright, regardless of whether rights in the copyright are licensed.25 In other words,
ownership of a copy is dependent on the physical object embodying
the copyright, not the rights authorized by the copyright owner with
respect to use of the copy.26 Thus, ownership of the copyright is
based on the ability to engage in acts reserved for the copyright owner,27 regardless of whether a copy of the copyrighted work was sold,
rented, leased, or loaned for the purposes of exercising such rights
under the copyright.28
Ownership of copies should not be determined by contractual
restrictions governing the copyright.29 In order to remain consistent
with the Copyright Act, title in downloads should pass to the consumers with the sale of the copy, regardless of the restrictions placed
on the use of the copyright.30 Of course, consistent with contract
24

See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the
work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of
itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object;
nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property
rights in any material object.

Id.
25

Id.
Id.; Robert J. Bernstein & Robert W. Clarida, Promotional CDs and Software Face
First Sale Doctrine, N.Y.L.J., (Jan. 21, 2011), available at Lexis.
27
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A „transfer of copyright ownership‟ is an assignment, mortgage,
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or
place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”). Note that one can be a copyright
owner by obtaining an exclusive license, which authorizes that person or company to use
some or all of the rights within the copyright. See id.
28
See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Bernstein, supra note 26.
29
See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (noting the separation between the copy and the copyright);
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i] (“[T]he first sale inquiry examines
ownership of the tangible property in which the copyrighted work has been embodied, not
ownership of the copyright itself.”).
30
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3. In Nimmer & Nimmer‟s discussion of Microsoft
Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), where the
court found that “Microsoft only license[d] and d[id] not sell its [p]roducts,” id. at 213, they
stated that the court “entirely misunderstood the first sale doctrine” if it “inferred simply
from the fact that the copyright to the software was licensed to end-users that Section 109(a)
was therefore somehow inapplicable . . . .” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3.
26
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principles, a consumer could contract away his right to ownership;
however, the consumer‟s lack of ownership would be the result of the
agreement rather than the result of restrictions placed on the copyright.31 Thus, if rights under a copyright were licensed to the consumer, as they were in Vernor, it would be possible that the consumer
nevertheless owned the copies being used to exercise those rights.32
The consumer would still be able to exercise his rights as an owner of
a copy even though a license was granted with respect to the copyright.
Moreover, even if the language of § 202 was strictly construed, as previously proposed, and consumers were deemed to be
owners of the downloaded copies in their possession, the defenses
available to them would be nearly useless. The nature of digital
downloads seemingly requires a license to use the copyright because
consumers must be able to exercise rights exclusively reserved for the
copyright owner which are not included in the defenses.33 For example, to resell a download under the first sale doctrine, the consumer is
31
See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 n.6 (stating that a person could be contractually liable if
there was a violation of an agreement following a first sale; however, the person would not
have infringed upon the copyright); Nimmer, supra note 4, at 1312 (stating that all transactions are not inherently first sales, and that the right to own a product may be limited by
contract).
32
Cf. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12 (finding that the copy was not owned because the copyright was licensed).
33
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006), with 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117. Section 106 states,
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:

(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106. See supra note 2 for 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a) and 117 (first sale doctrine and
essential step defense).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss1/9

6

Lahm: Buying a Digital Download ?

2012

BUYING A DIGITAL DOWNLOAD?

217

required to sell the machine on which the file was downloaded,34 because the first sale doctrine does not grant to the owner of a copy the
right to make any necessary reproductions in order to resell that
copy.35 Prohibited reproductions include making copies on to a CD
or media player. On the other hand, if the download were a computer
program, which is protected by the essential step defense, the consumer would be able to make the necessary reproductions, because
such reproductions are necessary for the file‟s intended use.36
Consequently, the only protection that would be available for
owners of digital files under the current Copyright Act is the fair use
doctrine.37 However, reliance on the fair use doctrine is unreasonable
when a license agreement accompanies a digital product, because the
consumer‟s use of the copy will be restricted by that license agreement and the associated digital rights management systems used by
copyright owners in an attempt to battle piracy and infringement in
the digital age.38 Although the consumer may be the owner of the

34

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E] (indicating that one qualifies as a
lawful owner of a copy by owning the machine on which it is stored, because it is the machine‟s RAM which contains the copy).
35
17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (allowing owners of software program copies
to make necessary reproductions).
36
See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (allowing necessary reproductions for software programs);
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005) (same).
37
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The fair use doctrine states,
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id.
38

See infra note 169.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 [2012], Art. 9

218

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 28

physical product embodying the digital files,39 a strict and overly controlling license agreement may have the effect of rendering useless
the ownership rights under the Copyright Act.
As long as a license is required to use an object, owners and
possessors of copies are contractually limited in their rights, regardless of the rights granted by the Copyright Act. These difficulties
may demonstrate why courts have found that the existence of a license establishes a lack of ownership of the copy. Copies may be
leased for purposes of exercising rights granted to the possessors by
the copyright owner, meaning they are not owned by consumers. On
the other hand, copies may be owned in addition to rights being
licensed, but the license has the capability of hindering the effectiveness of the ownership rights. Either way, the existence of a license
trumps, or at least has the potential to trump, the rights belonging to
an owner of a copy.
This Comment demonstrates that consumers of digital downloads are likely not owners of the copies they purchase based on the
Ninth Circuit‟s recent interpretations of the Copyright Act, 40 and
therefore need additional protection as possessors of copies. However, even if court decisions in the near future hold otherwise, the current Act would be ineffective in governing their ownership rights
when the use of the copies is subject to a license agreement, as are
most digital downloads.41 Section I discusses the distinction between
the exclusive rights comprised in the copyright and the object embodying the copyrighted work, and the difference between a copyright
owner and an owner of a copy. Section II explores methods of determining ownership of copies and examines conflicts that have arisen between the Copyright Act and recent Ninth Circuit cases as digital media becomes increasingly popular. Section III evaluates the
effects of the Ninth Circuit‟s decisions, ultimately concluding that
consumers of digital downloads are limited in their rights regardless
of whether they are found to own the copies of the musical recordings. Finally, Section IV discusses the need for changes in the Copyright Act to preserve consumers‟ rights as digital downloads become
39
This includes digitally transmitted files. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at §
8.12[E].
40
See UMG v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011); Vernor v. Autodesk, 621
F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
41
Cf. UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (finding that no effective license existed because UMG‟s
attempt to limit use restrictions were insufficient to create a license).
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the norm, and the line between the copy and the copyright begins to
fade.
II.

THE BASICS: DISTINGUISHING THE COPYRIGHT FROM THE
COPY AND THE COPYRIGHT OWNER FROM THE OWNER OF
THE COPY

The Copyright Act distinguishes between the copyright and
the object embodying it.42 The Eleventh Circuit has aptly stated,
“[C]opyright is a series of specified rights to which a designated
work is subject . . . . One may use the work without using the copyright, but one cannot use the copyright without using the work – one
does not infringe the work, rather one infringes the copyright.”43
The Act grants varying protections to both the owners of the
copyright and the owners of the embodying object.44 The owner of a
copyright has the exclusive rights of reproduction in copies or phonorecords, preparation of derivative works, public distribution of copies
or phonorecords, public performance, public display, and public performance of sound recordings by digital audio transmission.45 Accordingly, the copyright owner is entitled to authorize any of these
rights, such as reproduction and distribution.46 Copyright owners in
the digital age authorize this publishing right to digital distributors
and publishing companies, from which consumers may purchase copies of the embodying object.47 Conversely, a consumer who owns a
copy is, with few exceptions, prohibited from exercising or authorizing these exclusive rights.48 Two exceptions are the first sale doc42

17 U.S.C. § 202; see supra note 24.
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543 n.23 (11th Cir. 1996).
44
17 U.S.C. § 202; Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1111-12; F.B.T. Prods., LLC v.
Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 961-62, 965 (9th Cir. 2010).
45
17 U.S.C. § 106; see supra note 33.
46
17 U.S.C. § 101 (noting that copyright ownership may be transferred using an exclusive
license); Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12 (holding that Autodesk licensed its software to program users); F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 967 (finding that the copyright owner licensed reproduction and distribution rights to third party distributors).
47
Nimmer, supra note 4; see Michael I. Rudell & Neil J. Rosini, Electronic Books Reshape Publishing Industry, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 2010, at 3 (noting that, based on state contract
law and the original publishing license between parties, the right to publish e-books may lie
with the publishing company distributing the physical book or may lie with the author, who
may work directly with a digital distributor to distribute the work).
48
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Although
. . . the owner of the copyright[] has exclusive rights in the promotional CDs, „exemptions,
compulsory licenses, and defenses found in the Copyright Act narrow [those] rights.‟ ”)
43
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trine and the essential step defense, both of which provide owners of
copies with an affirmative defense to copyright infringement.49
To see the difference between the copy and the copyright,
review the classic example of a book50: A consumer who enters a
bookstore and purchases a book has the right to take the book home,
read it, place it on a shelf, or even use it as a paperweight. 51 The consumer owns a copy of the author‟s copyrighted work, and the uses
just described would not conflict with the copyright owner‟s exclusive rights.52 The same can be applied to one who purchases and
owns a copy of a music CD, in which the copyright owner has exclusive rights to the musical recording.53
On the other hand, if the copyright owner were to license the
copyright, say to a publishing company for purposes of public distribution, the copyright owner would be granting permission to exercise
one of the exclusive rights.54 This right is granted separately and regardless of whether ownership of a copy was transferred. 55 For ex(quoting Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff‟s Dep‟t, 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir.
2006)).
49
17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117(a); Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107.
50
Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (holding that the exclusive right
to “vend” or sell does not include the right to control future retail sales merely by notice
without privity of contract regarding such an exclusive right); Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402
F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he author of a book, or her assignee, ordinarily owns the
copyright in the book and thus the sole right to authorize copying; each purchaser of a copy
of the book owns that copy, but is generally not entitled to make copies from it.”); NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[C] (“A „book‟ is merely a material object that may embody, and hence constitute, a copy of a given literary work. . . . There is but a single work of
authorship, no matter how numerous and diverse the copies. By like reasoning, the „author‟
is the originator of the intangible material (e.g., the novel) . . . .”).
51
See Krause, 402 F.3d at 122; Bernstein, supra note 26. An owner of a copy also has the
rights prescribed under the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense, which will be
discussed in Parts II and IV, respectively.
52
17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing the copyright owner‟s exclusive rights); Krause, 402 F.3d at
122; Bernstein, supra note 26.
53
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[C] (“The same distinction is made as between „sound recordings,‟ which are works of authorship, and „phonorecords,‟ which merely
embody such sounds.”).
54
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership”); see 17 U.S.C. § 202
(“[T]ransfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright [does
not] convey property rights in any material object.”); Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350-51
(noting that the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright may be transferred by privity of
contract but not by mere notice).
55
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 202.
The principle restated in section 202 [this section] is a fundamental and
important one: that copyright ownership and ownership of a material object in which the copyrighted work is embodied are entirely separate
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ample, in order to exercise the exclusive rights granted, the copy‟s
possession could transfer either in the form of a loan, rental, or lease
(in which case the licensee would not own the copy), or in the form
of a sale or gift (in which case the licensee would own the copy).56
The fact that an agreement accompanied the transfer of the copy‟s
possession does not bar a finding of ownership.57 Importantly, when
there is a transfer of ownership of the copy in addition to a contractual license of the copyright, a violation of the agreement beyond that
which pertains to the copyright owner‟s rights is a breach of contract
rather than copyright infringement.58 As demonstrated, the ability to
license a copyright and the ability to transfer ownership are distinct
from each other as required by § 202 of the Copyright Act.
III.

ADAPTING TO A DIGITAL AGE: FINDING A METHOD TO
DETERMINE OWNERSHIP OF A COPY

Under the Copyright Act, the right to raise certain affirmative
defenses to copyright infringement is limited to owners of copies.59
Thus, for purposes of the defenses, “ownership” is based on ownerthings. Thus, transfer of a material object does not of itself carry any
rights under the copyright, and this includes transfer of the copy or phonorecord--the original manuscript, the photographic negative, the unique
painting or statue, the master tape recording, etc.--in which the work was
first fixed. Conversely, transfer of a copyright does not necessarily require the conveyance of any material object.
Id.; Krause, 402 F.3d at 122 (“Ownership of a copy is something distinct from copyright
ownership.”).
56
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”); see 17 U.S.C. § 202
(indicating that ownership of the copy is separate from ownership of the copyright); NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][a].
57
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][b] (stating that a resale or use
restriction placed on the copyrighted item by the copyright holder would not render the purchaser liable in an infringement action for a violation of that restriction).
58
Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If Autodesk‟s transfer of
[the software] copies to CTA was a first sale, then CTA‟s resale of the software in violation
of the SLA‟s terms would be a breach of contract, but would not result in copyright liability.” (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977))); see Bobbs-Merrill,
210 U.S. at 350-51 (noting that privity of contract is required between the copyright owner
and an owner of a copy in order to limit the rights of the owner of the copy).
59
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 (“[The first sale doctrine] allows the „owner of a particular
copy‟ of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of his copy without the copyright owner‟s authorization.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 109(a))); id. at 1109 (“[A] software user who is the „owner of a copy‟ of a copyrighted software program does not infringe by making a copy of the
computer program, if the new copy is „created as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program in conjunction with a machine and . . . is used in no other manner.‟ ”
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1))).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 [2012], Art. 9

222

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 28

ship of the copy rather than ownership of the copyright, and a person
must own rather than merely possess a copy in order to raise these
defenses.60 This also means that ownership of the copy could be determined regardless of whether any of the rights comprised in the
copyright have been transferred.61
Historically, the copyright owner‟s exclusive right of public
distribution was limited to “the first public distribution of an authorized copy.”62 This was, and still is, also known as a “first sale,” and
while a sale is not actually required, such a transfer of possession
transfers ownership of the copy.63 Upon the transfer of ownership of
a particular copy, the copyright owner loses the exclusive right to
control public distribution of that copy.64 Thus, the owner of the
copy could resell, lend, or dispose of the copy without infringing
upon the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.65 This first sale
doctrine, which aids in establishing a transfer of ownership in a copy,
also acts as an affirmative defense for owners of copies in a suit by
copyright owners for infringement.66
The leading Supreme Court case regarding the first sale doctrine, Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus,67 held that a copyright owner‟s right to distribution, or right to “vend” as it was then called, does
not include the right to control future retail sales merely by notice of
such control absent privity of contract regarding the exclusive right at
issue.68 The Bobbs-Merrill Company, the copyright owner of the literary work embodied in the novel, The Castaway, attempted to restrict sales of copies of the novel by printing the following copyright
statement in the book69:
60

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i] (“[T]he first sale inquiry examines ownership of the tangible property in which the copyrighted work has been embodied, not ownership of the copyright itself.”).
61
See id. (“[T]he first sale inquiry examines ownership of the tangible property in which
the copyrighted work has been embodied, not ownership of the copyright itself.”); see supra
note 55.
62
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 106; see 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); BobbsMerrill, 210 U.S. at 350.
63
17 U.S.C. § 109(a); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1179-80 (9th
Cir. 2011); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][a].
64
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1179-80 (citing Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350).
65
See id. (“[A] copyright owner who transfers title in a particular copy to a purchaser or
donee cannot prevent resale of that particular copy.”); Bernstein, supra note 26.
66
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1179-80 (citing Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350).
67
210 U.S. 339 (1908).
68
Id. at 350-51.
69
Id. at 341.
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The price of this book at retail is [one dollar] net. No
dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at
a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
copyright.70
In a suit against Macy & Company, which purchased the books from
a wholesale dealer and then re-sold them for eighty-nine cents per
copy,71 the Court found that Congress did not intend to grant copyright owners the ability to restrict future sales by use of a printed notice when it granted the “sole right to vend.”72 The right to vend does
not secure a right to copyright owners past the “sale of the book to a
purchaser” merely by printing a notice of such a restriction because
the copyright owner is not in privity of contract with those future
purchasers.73 Thus, Macy & Company was not bound by the purported license in the copyright statement because the Bobbs-Merrill
Company lost its exclusive right to distribute those copies beyond the
first sale to a purchaser.74
The first sale doctrine, established in Bobbs-Merrill, was later
codified in § 109 of the Copyright Act.75 It permits the sale or disposition of a copyrighted work if the possessor in fact owns that particular copy.76 Just as in Bobbs-Merrill, the copyright owner loses its
sole right to vend or distribute the material copy upon the first sale of
a copy to a purchaser.77 Because the doctrine applies only to “owners
70

Id.
Id. at 342.
72
Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350-51. The Court further noted that copyright protection is
“purely a question of statutory construction,” id. at 350, based on the rights created by Congress pursuant to Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution, id. at 346. At the time this case was decided,
Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes of the United States granted to an author the “sole liberty of . . . vending” his work. Copyright Act of 1891, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1107, reprinted in
Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 348. Sections 106(3) and 109 of the current Copyright Act replaced the right to vend with the right to distribute, and “[l]ike the exclusive right to „vend‟
that was construed in Bobbs-Merrill, the exclusive right to distribute is a limited right.”
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‟anza Research Int‟l, Inc. 523 U.S. 135, 144 (1998).
73
Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350.
74
Id. at 350-51.
75
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The rule of
Bobbs-Merrill remains in full force, enshrined as it is in § 109(a) of the [Copyright] Act: a
copyright owner who transfers title in a particular copy to a purchaser or donee cannot prevent resale of that particular copy.”).
76
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title . . . is entitled . . . to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord.”); see UMG, 628 F.3d at 1179.
77
See Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350 (“The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority
of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition
71
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of copies,” the alleged first sale must transfer ownership of the copy;
it cannot solely transfer the copy‟s possession accompanied by a
grant of the copyright owner‟s exclusive rights.78
The advent of digital content has required copyright owners to
increase the amount of control they exercise over the copyright and
consequently the copies that are subject to the terms of the copyright
authorization. Thus, when possession of a digital copy is transferred,
it is difficult to discern whether the transfer is intended as a transfer
of copyright ownership, a transfer of ownership of the copy, or a
transfer of both.79 This results in a blurred distinction between the
copy and the copyright.
The Ninth Circuit, while wrestling with the applicable standard for determining ownership of copies in recent decisions, failed
to maintain the distinction set forth in § 202.80 For example, in
F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records,81 the Ninth Circuit
held that the transfer of copies from Aftermath Records, the copyright owner, to third party distributors such as iTunes constituted a
license for the purpose of determining royalty payments due to the
original copyright owners, F.B.T. Productions.82 The agreement between F.B.T. and Aftermath set forth a Records Sold provision and a
Masters Licensed provision; the first required a royalty payment of
twelve to twenty percent on all “records sold in the United States . . .
through normal retail channels,”83 and the second required payment
of fifty percent of “masters licensed . . . for their manufacture and

of it.”).
78
See UMG, 628 F.3d at 1179-80 (“Particularly with regard to computer software, we
have recognized that copyright owners may create licensing arrangements so that users acquire only a license to use the particular copy of software and do not acquire title that permits further transfer or sale of that copy without the permission of the copyright owner.”);
Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010).
79
In other words, if possession of a digital copy is transferred to a consumer, the copyright owner may be intending to: (1) transfer title in that individual copy but retain ownership in the copyright, (2) retain title in the copy but license some or all of the copyright owner‟s exclusive rights, or (3) transfer title in the copy and grant a license to some or all of the
copyright owner‟s rights. See F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 96465 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Quality King Distribs. v. L‟anza Research Int‟l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,
145 (1998)); see also UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-11; Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005).
80
See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (stating the distinction between the copy and the copyright).
81
621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
82
Id. at 964.
83
Id. at 961.
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sale of records or for any other uses.”84 F.B.T. argued that the Masters Licensed provision applied to the downloads transferred to third
party distributors for purposes of reproduction and distribution, while
Aftermath argued that the Records Sold provision applied, because
the copies were sold to the distributors for distribution through “normal retail channels.”85
Ultimately, the court held that the records were licensed to
third party distributors rather than sold, and therefore F.B.T. was
owed the royalties set forth in the Masters Licensed provision.86 In
other words, if the masters were licensed, then they could not have
been sold and the transaction would not fall within the Records Sold
provision.87 The court acknowledged that the Masters Licensed provision was broad, but noted that its breadth did not make it ambiguous.88 With respect to the transaction between Aftermath and the
distributors, the court found that Aftermath retained title to the copyright and the digital files, retained the right to regain possession, and
received recurring benefits.89 Therefore, no sale occurred, rendering
the transaction a license.90
Finally, to further support its finding, the court cited statutory
and case law, stating:
It is easily gleaned from these sources of federal copyright law that a license is an authorization by the copyright owner to enable another party to engage in behavior that would otherwise be the exclusive right of the
copyright owner, but without transferring title in those
rights. This permission can be granted for the copyright itself, for the physical media containing the copyrighted work, or for both the copyright and the
physical media.91
84
Id. The parties defined a “master” in the agreement as “recording of sound, without or
with visual images, which is used or useful in the recording, production or manufacture of
records.” Id. at 961-62.
85
F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 961-62.
86
Id. at 964.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 965.
90
F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965.
91
Id. (citing Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff‟s Dep‟t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.
2006); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977); Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100
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The court‟s analysis conflates the distinction between ownership of the copy and ownership of the copyright in two ways. First, it
found that the transaction between Aftermath and the distributors was
a license because it was not a sale.92 In other words, the court attempted to define a “sale” and a “license” as if they were two opposing methods to obtain possession of the combined copy and copyright.93 As a result, if the transaction cannot be categorized as one,
then it must be the other.94 Because there was no transfer of title in
the copies and Aftermath retained control over the copies, the court
concluded that no records were sold, and therefore, the transaction
must have fallen within the Masters Licensed provision.95 Consequently, ownership of the copyright was dependent on ownership of
the copy. This was not the intent of § 202, which allows for the possibility of a sale of copies independent from the licensing of the rights
under the copyright.96
Second, the court‟s definition of “license” allows a copyright
owner to license the copy rather than the copyright.97 Yet, the definition also defines licensing as “enabl[ing] another party to engage in
behavior that would otherwise be the exclusive right of the copyright
owner,” which correctly speaks to licensing the copyright.98 Although a copy may be necessary to exercise rights licensed under the
copyright, it is not the copy itself that is being licensed when the copyright is being licensed.99 Rather, the transfer of possession of the
copy, depending on the circumstances, takes place in the form of a
(9th Cir. 1960)). Moreover, the court found, “[I]t is well settled that where a copyright owner transfers a copy of copyrighted material, retains title [to the material copy], limits the uses
to which the material may be put, and is compensated periodically based on the transferee‟s
exploitation of the material, the transaction is a license.” Id.
92
Id. at 964-65.
93
Id. at 965 (“Much as Section 109 describes a „sale‟ under the „first sale‟ doctrine, various other sections of the Copyright Act illuminate the meaning of the term „license.‟ For
example, section 114(f), titled „Licenses for Certain Nonexempt Transmissions,‟ describes
the statutory authorization for a third party to exercise public performance rights that otherwise remain the exclusive rights of a copyright holder and defines this authorization as a „license.‟ ”).
94
Id.
95
F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965-66.
96
17 U.S.C. § 202.
97
See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965.
98
Id. (emphasis added); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 202.
99
See Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (holding that the copyright
owner was unable to place restrictions on the copies by attempting to license its exclusive
right to vend); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[C].
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sale, rental, lease, or loan.100
Just a few months later, in Vernor v. Autodesk, the Ninth Circuit held that the user of a software program was a licensee rather
than the owner of copies, and therefore, the user did not have the
right to redistribute physical copies of the software under the first
sale doctrine because the distribution was in violation of the software‟s license agreement.101 The court noted that licensees may
“rightfully possess, but do not own, [] cop[ies] of copyrighted software” and therefore are not entitled to the same rights as an owner of
a copy.102
Timothy Vernor came into possession of copies of Autodesk‟s
copyrighted software by purchasing these copies from Cardwell/Thomas & Associates, Inc. (“CTA”). CTA had obtained these
copies directly from Autodesk, accompanied by a software license
agreement (“SLA”), which granted CTA a nontransferable license for
the software and which imposed use and transfer restrictions on the
use of the copy.103 For example, under the SLA, CTA was barred
from “renting, leasing, or transferring the software without Autodesk‟s prior consent and from electronically or physically transferring
the software out of the Western Hemisphere.”104 Nevertheless, CTA
sold the used copies to Vernor in an office sale, accompanied by the
license agreements, and Vernor proceeded to sell the copies on eBay
where Autodesk discovered them.105
The court considered the issue whether CTA and therefore
Vernor were owners of the copies in their possession.106 If a “first
sale” of the copies occurred when CTA purchased the license granting CTA rights under the copyright, then CTA was an owner of the
copies and had a right to resell them to Vernor.107 A violation of any
terms of the “license” barring him from doing so would be a breach
100

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”); 17 U.S.C. § 202 (indicating that ownership of the material object is separate from ownership of the copyright);
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][a].
101
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2010); see 17 U.S.C. §
109(a).
102
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112; see id. at 1112 n.13 (“[T]he Copyright Act confers this [essential step] defense only on owners of software copies. . . . [A] licensee‟s right to use the
software . . . is conferred by the terms of its license agreement.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117)).
103
Id. at 1103-04.
104
Id. at 1104.
105
Id. at 1104-05.
106
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107.
107
Id.
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of contract rather than copyright infringement.108 On the other hand,
if the copies were only provided to CTA for the purpose of exercising
the rights licensed under the copyright, then CTA would not be considered an owner of copies, and any sale of the copies would infringe
upon Autodesk‟s right of distribution.109
The decision reconciled prior precedents and established a
three-factor test to determine whether a software user is a licensee or
an owner of the software copy.110 Similar to F.B.T. Productions, the
court decided whether CTA and Vernor were owners of copies based
on whether they were licensees.111 The court found that a software
program user is a licensee (and therefore not an owner of a copy)
when (1) the user is specifically granted a license by the copyright
owner; (2) significant restrictions are placed on the user‟s ability to
transfer the product; and (3) any other significant use restrictions exist.112 The court noted that copies of copyrighted software can only
be licensed and rightfully possessed rather than owned, and therefore
those in possession are not entitled to the same rights as owners of
copies.113 Autodesk, as the copyright owner, retained title to the copyright and imposed restrictions on the software user, leading the court
to a finding that the software was licensed.114
Significantly, the court did not determine whether there was a
public distribution of authorized copies of the software, resulting in a
108

Id. at 1107 n.6.
Id.
110
Id. at 1110-11 (citing Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff‟s Dep‟t, 447 F.3d
769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995);
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977)); see Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110 (“Citing MAI, we held
[in Wall Data] that the essential step defense does not apply where the copyright owner
grants the user a license and significantly restricts the user‟s ability to transfer the software.”
(citing Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 773; MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d 511)); id. at 1109 (“[U]nder
Wise, where a transferee receives a particular copy of a copyrighted work pursuant to a written agreement . . . . [w]e may consider (1) whether the agreement was labeled a license and
(2) whether the copyright owner retained title to the copy, required its return or destruction,
forbade its duplication, or required the transferee to maintain possession of the copy for the
agreement‟s duration. We did not find any one factor dispositive . . . .” (citing Wise, 550
F.2d at 1190-92)).
111
See id. at 1107. The court refers to the licensing of the copies, rather than licensing of
the copyright, which again added to the confusion between the copy and the copyright. See
id. This analysis will be further scrutinized below, following the discussion of UMG. See
text accompanying notes 142-159.
112
Id. at 1110-11.
113
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112.
114
Id. at 1111.
109
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transfer of ownership in those particular copies.115 The court instead
found that, because the transaction satisfied the test for the licensing
of the copyright, the particular copies could not have been owned and
must have merely been possessed.116
This analysis is problematic under the first sale doctrine and §
202 of the Copyright Act.117 Once a particular copy has been publicly distributed for sale by the copyright owner, the copyright owner no
longer has the right to control distribution of that copy.118 Although
the distributor could request that the consumer agree to restrictions
regarding distribution, such an agreement serves as a contractual restriction on the material object rather than a license for copyright.119
In other words, a violation of any contractual agreement would only
be a breach of contract, rather than copyright infringement.120 Similarly, if the distribution were accompanied by a license for the copyright, that license would not be able to limit distribution because distribution is not an exclusive right of the copyright owner beyond the
first sale.121 Consequently, a license for the copyright cannot limit
the transfer of ownership, which can only be accomplished through a
contractual agreement limiting an owner‟s use of the copy.122 Although the court in Vernor acknowledged this breach of contract
theory and the first sale doctrine as established in Bobbs-Merrill, it
found that an express and restrictive license bars a finding of ownership of particular copies, and stated, “Bobbs-Merrill did not and

115

Ironically, the district court did hold that a first sale took place and therefore found that
CTA and Vernor owned the copies of the software program, regardless of the licensing restrictions placed on the use of the copyright. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2008). The district court also found that the precedential cases
were irreconcilable with respect to the effect of the license agreement, but nevertheless determined that there was a transfer in ownership of the copies. Id. at 1172. Prior to the circuit
court‟s reversal of this decision, it was cited by scholars who agreed that a first sale had taken place. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i].
116
See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
117
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 202.
118
See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
119
See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 n.6.
120
See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 n.6.
121
See 17 U.S.C. § 109; Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350.
122
See 17 U.S.C. § 109; Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350. If a contract limits a potential
owner‟s right to exercise various ownership rights, such as resale of the copy, this may be
indicative that a transfer of ownership did not take place, as is also the case with rentals. See
Nimmer, supra note 4, at 1312. Even in this case, however, limitations placed upon the possessor as a potential owner of a copy, and not limitations placed upon the copyright, determine whether there was a transfer of ownership. See id.
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could not address the question of whether the right to use software is
distinct from the ownership of copies of software.”123 This statement
regarding Bobbs-Merrill furthers the contention that Vernor has conflated the distinction between the copy and the copyright.
Finally, in UMG Recording, Inc. v. Augusto, despite certain
licensing language on the labels, the court found that recipients of
promotional CDs were owners of those copies and therefore could
raise the first sale doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement after reselling the copies.124 Troy Augusto, an unintended recipient of
promotional CDs who then sold his copies, alleged that he was protected by the first sale doctrine.125 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court in favor of Augusto, but supported his
ownership rights for different reasons.126
The district court stated that, in order to be protected by the
first sale defense, Augusto would have to prove: “(1) the CDs were
lawfully manufactured with UMG‟s authorization; (2) UMG transferred title to the CDs; (3) Augusto was the lawful owner of the CDs;
and (4) Augusto disposed of, but did not reproduce, the CDs.”127
UMG disputed parts two and three of this standard – that it transferred title in the copies and that Augusto was the lawful owner of the
CDs.128 The district court, on two separate grounds, found that UMG
did transfer title in the copies and thus Augusto was the lawful owner.129 First, the court looked to the “economic realities of the transaction,” noting that UMG‟s inability to regain possession coupled with
the recipients‟ freedom from obligation to UMG was indicative of a
sale.130 Second, the court found that the CDs were gifts under the
federal Unordered Merchandise Statute, resulting in a transfer of title
from UMG to the recipients.131
123

See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107, 1114 (citing Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. 339). Cf. NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 3, at [B][1][d][i].
124
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011).
125
Id. at 1179.
126
Id. at 1182.
127
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d,
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1177.
128
Id. at 1060.
129
Id. at 1060, 1062.
130
Id. at 1060.
131
Id. at 1062 (“The Postal Reorganization Act prohibits „the mailing of unordered merchandise‟ without „the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient.‟ This merchandise
„may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or
dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without obligation whatsoever to the sender.‟ ” (quot-
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The circuit court affirmed, but noted that its decision was
based on “somewhat different grounds.”132 The court focused on the
distribution method, finding that (1) the nature of UMG‟s distribution
did not provide for sufficient control or monitoring of the use and
transfer of the CDs by the recipients,133 and (2) UMG‟s mailing of the
CDs without having received an order or request for the copies from
the recipients fell within the Unordered Merchandise Statute, thereby
allowing the recipients to use or dispose of the received copy as they
saw fit.134 It criticized the district court for “rel[ying]” on UMG‟s inability to regain possession of the copies.135 Citing Vernor, the court
noted that an inability to regain possession was not conclusive evidence of a sale.136 Rather, the court considered UMG‟s “means of
distribution,” and found it indicative of a transfer of ownership of the
copy because UMG‟s method left them with no control over the copies.137 The failure to regain possession was evidence of that lack of
control, although it could not be used conclusively to show ownership.138
The circuit court‟s decision makes two important points.
First, similar to Bobbs-Merrill, the court correctly found that there
had been a transfer of ownership in the copies, distinct from any attempted restrictions on the use of the copyright.139 However, the
court claimed that the district court relied on the copyright owner‟s
inability to regain possession, when in fact, the district court focused
on the economic realities of the transaction, just as the circuit court
relied on the means of distribution.140 Second, both courts looked to
ing 39 U.S.C. § 3009)).
132
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182.
133
Id. at 1180, 1183.
134
Id. at 1180-81 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3009(a), (b)).
135
Id. at 1182-83.
136
Id. at 1183 (citing Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1977)).
137
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183.
138
Id.
139
Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
140
See UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055,
1062 (C.D. Cal. 2008). The circuit court even used the same language as the district court
by stating that a failure to return a product may be evidence that a copyright owner did not
“retain „sufficient incidents of ownership . . . to be sensibly considered the owner of the copies.‟ ” UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.
2005)). Krause used this standard to determine ownership of a computer program copy, subsequently noting that a formal transfer of title is not required for a finding of ownership.
Krause, 402 F.3d at 124. “The presence or absence of formal title may of course be a factor
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the Unordered Merchandise Statute to find that there had been a
transfer in ownership of the copies.141
At first reading, the circuit court did not affirm the decision
on different grounds. However, it appeared to use the decision as an
attempt to reconcile the UMG holding with its decision in Vernor just
a few months earlier. The district court in UMG looked to the four
elements used to determine whether a first sale had occurred through
a public distribution of authorized copies. 142 Such an analysis did not
take place in Vernor, nor did it take place in UMG‟s circuit court decision. The circuit court in UMG used a “means of distribution”
analysis, whereas Vernor applied a three-part test, requiring the copyright owner to specify that the user is granted a license.143 The court
in UMG found it permissible to use different standards because recipients of promotional CDs were in a “very different position” from
users of software programs.144 Software users “order and pay” for the
copies transferred into their possession, while recipients of promotional CDs receive unordered copies without agreeing to be bound by
any terms of their use.145 In Vernor, the acceptance of the terms by
the software user was undisputed.146 However, UMG failed to obtain
such an agreement.147 It did not even have arrangements in place to
in this inquiry, but the absence of formal title may be outweighed by evidence that the possessor of the copy enjoys sufficiently broad rights over it to be sensibly considered its owner.” Id. The court held in favor of the possessor of the copies, observing that the copyright
owner allowed the possessor to “possess and use the programs forever” and thus did not “exercise[] sufficient incidents of ownership over [the] copy of the program to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy.” Id.
141
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180; UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
142
See UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1059; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at §
8.12[B][1][a].
143
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (citing Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (9th Cir.
2010)).
144
Id. at 1183.
145
Id.
[S]oftware users . . . are in a very different position from that held by the
recipients of UMG‟s promotional CDs. . . . UMG has virtually no control
over the unordered CDs it issues because of its means of distribution,
and it has no assurance that any recipient has assented or will assent to
the creation of any license or accept its limitations.
Id.
146
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1104-05 (“[C]ustomers must accept [the software license agreement (“SLA”)] before installing the software. A customer who does not accept the SLA can
return the software for a full refund. . . . CTA agreed to the SLA.”).
147
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182 & n.6. UMG had stated in its promotional statement, “Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license.” Id.
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track the recipients‟ use and transfer of the particular copies.148 Thus,
UMG did not “retain „sufficient incidents of ownership‟ ” over the
copies, as Autodesk had in Vernor through its accepted license
agreement, in order to establish that ownership of the copies had not
been transferred to the recipients.149
The court in UMG further distinguished Vernor by applying
the Unordered Merchandise Statute to the distribution of the promotional CDs.150 The statute treats unordered merchandise as gifts and
allows the recipients of such items to “retain, use, discard, or dispose
of [them] in any manner [they] see fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender.”151 Accordingly, the promotional CDs, which
were mailed by UMG without being ordered by the recipients, qualify as “unordered merchandise” and therefore establish the recipients
as owners, granting them the right to do with the CDs as they wish.152
Despite the Ninth Circuit‟s efforts to create a standard for determining ownership, the court failed to enunciate a standard for a
situation similar to one involving digital downloads.153 The court in
UMG limited the standard set forth in Vernor to software users154 and
emphasized the nature of UMG‟s distribution to support its conclusion that those in possession of music recordings own the CDs.155
The promotional distribution was distinguished from that of a software program based on the distribution method, which lacked copyright owner control and involved an application of the Unordered
Merchandise Statute.156 Although the UMG holding was not expressThe court noted that “acceptance” of a CD may in fact be able to constitute an agreement,
however there was no evidence that the individual recipients “accept[ed]” the CD. Id. at
1182. Silence or inaction following the receipt of an unsolicited offer does constitute an acceptance of the offer. Id. at 1182 n.6 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69
cmts. a, c).
148
Id. at 1180 (“[T]he promotional CDs are dispatched to the recipients without any prior
arrangement as to those particular copies. The CDs are not numbered, and no attempt is
made to keep track of where particular copies are or what use is made of them.”).
149
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (citing Krause, 402 F.3d at 124).
150
Id. at 1180-81 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3009(a), (b)). “Th[e] effect of the Unordered Merchandise Statute distinguishes this case from those involving computer software, where the
software consumers clearly ordered and paid for the software licensed to them.” Id. at 1181.
151
Id. (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 3009(b)).
152
Id. at 1180-81 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3009(a), (b)).
153
See infra Part III.
154
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (“This formulation . . . applies in terms to software users.”).
155
Id. at 1180 (“Our conclusion that the recipients acquired ownership of the CDs is based
largely on the nature of UMG‟s distribution.”).
156
Id. at 1180-83.
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ly limited to promotional CDs,157 the court in Vernor noted that the
“economic realities of the transaction” (in other words, the method of
the copies‟ distribution as used in UMG), were not dispositive of
ownership of the copies.158 The court instead focused on the effect of
the distribution on the copyright, rather than the effect on the object
embodying it.159 Thus, the court left unresolved the applicable standard to resolve a claim in which a non-computer program copy, such
as a music recording, is ordered and purchased, and the copyright
owner asserts control over the transfer and use of the copies, such as
ensuring the possessors‟ acceptance of a license agreement.
IV.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: THE EFFECT OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON DIGITAL DOWNLOADS
A.

If the Ninth Circuit’s Rule Applies, Consumers Do
Not Own the Digital Downloads They Purchase
Through Software Programs.

The Ninth Circuit cases create two distinct categories, and
digital downloads are a hybrid. Vernor, according to UMG, applies
to software cases only, and precludes a finding of ownership in the
copy when parties have expressly entered into a license agreement for
the copyright that imposes significant use and transfer restrictions on
the copy.160 UMG uses a “means of distribution” standard instead of
relying upon accompanying license agreements in cases where, such
as with promotional CDs, the copyright owner lacks some level of
157

All statements of the holding refer to the nature, means, method, or circumstances of
the distribution of promotional CDs, finding that the copies of CDs transferred ownership
because of the means of distribution. See id. at 1183 (“UMG‟s distribution of the promotional CDs under the circumstances effected a sale (transfer of title) of the CDs to the recipients.”) (emphasis added). See also id. at 1180 (“We conclude that, under all the circumstances of the CDs‟ distribution, the recipients were entitled to use or dispose of them in any
manner they saw fit, and UMG did not enter a license agreement for the CDs with the recipients.”); UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182 (“[W]e conclude that UMG‟s transfer of possession to the
recipients, without meaningful control or even knowledge of the status of the CDs after
shipment, accomplished a transfer of title.”); id. at 1183 (“[W]e conclude that UMG‟s method of distribution transferred the ownership of the copies to the recipients . . . .”).
158
Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). Cf. Jim Graves, Who Owns
a Copy?, 2 CYBARIS 45, 70 (2011) (arguing that the “economic realities” test would be a
more suitable test than the one used by the circuit court in Vernor).
159
See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
160
See id. at 1110-11.
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control over the distribution of the CDs or enforcement of the purported license agreement.161 On the other hand, the court in F.B.T.
Productions required, for the finding of a license, a transfer of the
copy‟s possession, retention of ownership in the copyright, and restrictions on use of the copy, although it did not limit this standard to
a particular good.162
Digital downloads have qualities of the copies and distribution methods found in each of these Ninth Circuit cases, making it
difficult to determine which standard to use for the purpose of defining ownership of copies. First, downloads of music recordings are
copies, similar to the CDs transferred in UMG.163 A download is the
transmission from an online server to a local hard drive of an electronic file which contains a copy of the digital form of a work.164
This digital file cannot be opened, and in the case of music, listened
to, until after the file has been transmitted and saved on the user‟s
hard drive.165
At that point, however, the file must be opened using a compatible software program, also known as an online music store.166
This makes the transfer more like the situation in Vernor, because the
use of the software program requires the consumer to sign a software
license agreement.167 These software agreements typically require
that the consumer update the program upon the release of the latest
software, ensuring the distributor‟s constant contact with the user of
the program, as well as that consumer‟s compliance with the license
agreement.168 Additionally, due to the risks of piracy and copyright

161

UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182-83.
F.B.T. Prod., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010). Arguably, F.B.T. Productions, similar to Vernor, was incorrectly decided because it did not determine ownership of the copy as distinct from licensing of the copyright. Id. This distinction
was most closely realized in UMG, but the court failed to fully address it by not affirming
that part of the district court decision. See UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.
163
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E].
164
United States v. A.S.C.A.P., 627 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-1337,
2011 WL 4536526 (Oct. 3, 2011).
165
Id. at 71.
166
Id.; see In re Apple, No. C 05-00037 JW, 2010 WL 2629907, at *4; Purchasing Music,
iTunes Store Category listed on iTunes A to Z, supra note 4.
167
See Software License Agreement for iTunes, supra note 4; iTunes Store Terms and
Conditions, supra note 4.
168
See In re Apple, 2010 WL 2629907, at *4. Arguably, distributors like Apple also use
these software updates to maintain their alleged monopoly over audio downloads and digital
media players. See id.
162
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infringement involving digital media,169 the transferred copies are often encrypted with technological security measures called digital
rights management, or “DRM,” which further increases the amount
of control the copyright owner retains over the copies.170
F.B.T. Productions involved copies of music recordings, such
as digital downloads; however, the court still found, due to the restrictions placed on the use of the copy by the licensing provision, the
possessor of the copies was a licensee rather than the owner of the
copies.171 The court focused on the language of the agreement, which
it was unable to do in UMG because the CD recipients never accepted
the purported license.172 In this respect, the acquisition of a digital

169

A copyrighted work in its digital format can be identically reproduced and copied
through downloads without owning a physical copy. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928-29 (2005) (discussing the popularity of file-sharing
and noting that “every copy [in digital distribution] is identical to the original . . . .”). As
digital downloads grow in popularity due to the increase in quality and convenience at a decreased cost, the risk of piracy and copyright infringement increases. Richard Raysman &
Peter Brown, Digital Rights Managing, Content Identifying Via Hi-Tech, 240 N.Y.L.J. 3, 3
(2008) (“[W]ith the emergence of new technologies that allow manipulation of media, content owners have had diminished control over downstream users and consumers.”); see
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929 (imposing indirect liability on a software company due to “the
number of infringing downloads that occur every day using [the] software”); Maverick Recording v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2010) (collecting circuit court cases supporting the district court‟s ruling that the defendant directly infringed upon plaintiff‟s copyright
by downloading audio files), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010); A&M Record, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[Defendant‟s peer to peer file sharing program] has adverse effects on the developing digital download market.”).
170
See Raysman & Brown, supra note 169.
[D]igital rights management is a generic term referring to a variety of
technologies to prevent or minimize the unauthorized distribution, copying or access to copyrighted materials. . . . The goals of DRM are multifaceted: to prevent widespread, unauthorized distribution and piracy; facilitate adoption of legitimate digital content delivery methods; and perhaps enable enhanced commercialization of content displayed in new
technological formats.
Id. The use of these measures is enforced by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA). 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006); MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer and Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 2010) (“One of Congress‟ purposes behind enacting
the DMCA was targeting the circumvention of technological protections.”). There are many
forms of DRM, each having varying security levels. For example, some files are formatted
so that they are only compatible with the distributor‟s media players. See In re Apple, 2010
WL 2629907, at *4. Other forms include “content identification technology” such as “watermarks and [digital] fingerprints,” encryption technology such as CSS technology, and
product activation. Raysman & Brown, supra note 169; see also Matt Williams, Fending
Off Hackers, NAT‟L L.J. (Nov. 3, 2008), available at LAW.COM (discussing forms of DRM).
171
F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010).
172
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011).
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download is more like F.B.T. Productions because of the software
agreement between the parties.
This begs the question: because a digital download is a copy
of a music recording but requires the use of software and consequently an agreement to the software license terms, do consumers own the
copies they purchase as in UMG, or do they license them from the
copyright owners as in F.B.T. Productions and Vernor? The Ninth
Circuit cases leave a gap in their decisions for finding a standard to
use for copyrighted works in the form of digital downloads. As
noted, digital downloads and the circumstances surrounding their distribution contain similarities with each of the cases, but do not fit perfectly with any of them.
The court in UMG limited the standard used in its Vernor decision to software.173 Digital downloads themselves are not software
programs, although software programs are often required. UMG,
which applied to copies of music recordings rather than software,
found ownership of the copies by relying on the level of control retained by the copyright owner through the means of distribution rather than the language of the purported license.174 Although digital
downloads are copies of music recordings, the copyright owners retain a high level of control over these copies, and therefore UMG’s
distinction of software fails when applied to digital downloads. Like
the software users in Vernor, digital download consumers are required to accept license agreements, are entitled to software updates,
and are subjected to some form of DRM.175 Finally, in F.B.T. Productions, also a music recording case, the court found that the relevant copies were licensed rather than sold, relying on the language in
the parties‟ agreement.176
Applying these various cases to digital downloads, a distinction must be made between the required software, such as iTunes,
and the copies being purchased through the required software. If this
173

Id.; see Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2010).
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180. The distribution methods used in Vernor and UMG were also
distinguishable under the Unordered Merchandise Statute. See id. at 1180-81. However, the
court in UMG did not simply find a “first sale” as a result of this statute (which it likely
could have), and therefore, the remainder of this section will focus on the rest of the court‟s
rationale – the means of distribution and lack of control. See id. at 1180-83.
175
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1103-05; see Software License Agreement for iTunes, supra note
4; iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, supra note 4; supra note 170 (discussing types of digital rights management).
176
F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 964.
174
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distinction were maintained, the license agreement would apply only
to the software program, and a court would be able to find a “first
sale” of the downloads just as if the consumer had purchased them
from the local music store. However, this distinction is often not
maintained. The “software” license agreements for these music store
programs lay out the terms of use for any digital content purchased
through the product.177 Additionally, the agreements do not necessarily grant express ownership of the copy to the consumer.178 Although
the terms often refer to a purchase of the copies, the Ninth Circuit has
indicated that an accepted and restrictive license agreement is evidence that a transfer of ownership has not occurred, therefore making
the first sale doctrine inapplicable.179
Despite consumers‟ belief that they own authorized digital
downloads just as they have owned their CDs and cassettes,180 it
seems that under this new Ninth Circuit standard, consumers are licensees of digital downloads rather than owners of copies. In UMG,
the rationale used by the court to distinguish Vernor and the software
177
See iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, supra note 4 (“You agree that the Service and
certain Products include security technology that limits your use of Products and that . . . you
shall use Products in compliance with the applicable usage rules established by Apple and its
licensors. . . . [Apple] reserve[s] the right to change, suspend, remove, or disable access to
any Products [or] content.”); Software License Agreement for iTunes, supra note 4; Amazon
MP3 Music Service: Terms of Use, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/dmusic/help/
amd.html/ref=sv_dmusic_6 (follow “terms of use” link) (last updated Oct. 5, 2010) (“[W]e
grant you a non-exclusive, non-transferable right to use the Digital Content for your personal, non-commercial, entertainment use, subject to and in accordance with the Terms of
Use.”); supra note 170 (discussing types of digital rights management); see also Raburn, supra note 4, at 47-49 (discussing the Terms of Use and DRM used for the Amazon Kindle).
178
See iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, supra note 4. Apple refers to its consumers as
end users who purchase digital content which is subject to the terms and conditions agreement. Id. The Terms also refer to the transaction as a “sale,” and state that “title for all electronically delivered transactions pass to the purchaser . . . upon electronic transmission to the
recipient.” Id. However, as demonstrated by F.B.T. and UMG, these formal titles are not
dispositive of a particular transaction. See UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180 (holding that the transfers
of possession resulted in ownership of the copies despite the licensing notice); F.B.T. Prods.,
621 F.3d at 964 (holding that, despite the lack of express licensing language, the parties‟
agreement constituted a license).
179
See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-11; F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 964-65.
180
The copyright owner‟s public distribution of authorized copies, even in the form of
digitally downloaded copies, should trigger the first sale doctrine just as it does for the physical hardcopy versions. See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1106 (asserting that Vernor owned the purchased, authentic copies in his possession). Many consumers do not immediately notice the
difference in their title because, although copyright owners and distributors retain a high level of control over the copies, they allow consumers extra freedoms that the consumers would
have expected had they owned the copies. See Purchasing Music, iTunes Store Category
listed on iTunes A to Z, supra note 4.
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cases is limited in applicability to distinguishing the promotional CD
distribution method; the distinction between software and CDs fails
when applied to digital downloads because the copyright owners retain a substantial amount of control over the digital copies.181 Additionally, because this high level of control is partially in the form of a
software program with an accompanying license agreement which includes terms regarding the use of the copies, it seems that under
F.B.T. and arguably under Vernor as well, digital downloads are distributed in the form of licenses. Consequently, this means that there
is no “first sale” of the download due to the restrictive licensing
terms, and therefore a consumer cannot act pursuant to the first sale
doctrine without permission under the license.
B.

If Consumers Owned Digital Downloads, Their
Ownership Rights Could Not Be Exercised When
the Copies are Subject to License Agreements and
DRM

Arguably, the Ninth Circuit‟s decisions in Vernor and F.B.T.
Productions are incorrect when viewed in light of §§ 109 and 202,
and the decision in UMG, although correct when it was based on the
Unordered Merchandise Statute, is wrongly decided when based on
the means of distribution theory. Ownership of the copy, which permits the use of the first sale defense, is not a determination that
should be based on the copyright owner‟s control over its copyright;
the two aspects are statutorily distinct.182
For example, if the first sale doctrine were to be strictly applied to Vernor, then there would have been a first sale based on the
following analysis183: (1) The copies were lawfully manufactured because the copyright owner made them; (2) The physical copies were
lawfully transferred with Autodesk‟s authorization to CTA; (3) The
physical copies were owned by,184 rather than leased or rented to,
181

See supra note 177 (providing language from both Apple and Amazon‟s license
agreements and terms and conditions).
182
17 U.S.C. § 202; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i].
183
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i] (stating that, even with respect to licenses, “the first sale inquiry examines ownership of the tangible property in which
the copyrighted work has been embodied, not ownership of the copyright itself,” yet noting
that many courts have wrongly interpreted this).
184
For purposes of this analysis, “ownership” is assumed under a traditional approach,
prior to any analysis under Vernor, which stated that there would be no ownership where
there is a restrictive license. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1116.
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CTA (assuming there were no restrictions imposed on the copyright
affecting use of the copy); and (4) CTA disposed of the copies by
selling them to Vernor.185 Because all four elements were satisfied,
there would have been a first sale of the copy, the material object
embodying the copyright; the copyright owner publicly distributed
the particular authorized copies into the stream of commerce thus exhausting his exclusive distribution right.186 Notably, the use of the
copyrighted work is still restricted by any agreements to the extent
that any exist; however, if consumers were not considered the owners
of their copies, they would be unable to simply sell or dispose of the
products when they want to rid themselves of them.187
Assume, then, that consumers of digital downloads are in fact
owners of the copies in their possession. Under the first sale doctrine, this only gives them the right to sell, lend, or dispose of their
copy.188 Copies of digital downloads are presumably stored on the
consumers‟ hard drives, which limits the consumers to the sale of the
machine on which the file was downloaded.189 The consumers, as
owners of copies, may only assert the first sale doctrine as an affirmative defense with respect to the transfer of the copies, but not with
respect to any reproduction necessary to do so.190 Reproduction of
the copy, which would be required in order to transfer the digital
download, would infringe upon the copyright owners‟ exclusive
right.191
185

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][a] (illustrating the same test); id.
at § 8.12[B][1][d][i] (supporting the district court‟s decision in Vernor prior to the circuit
court‟s ruling which reversed the applicability of the first sale doctrine).
186
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‟anza Research Int‟l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998)).
187
See Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010); Nimmer, supra note 4,
at 1312 (discussing the relationship between contract principles and transfers of ownership).
188
17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
189
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E] (indicating that one qualifies as a
lawful owner of a copy by owning the machine on which it is stored, because it is the machine‟s RAM or hard drive which contains the copy).
190
Id. at § 8.12[D].
191
17 U.S.C. § 106; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E]
Consider the consequences of Amalyah, who holds a copy of her favorite
copyrighted work (be it musical recording, motion picture, novel, or other) in RAM, sending it to Benjamin‟s PC, who uploads it to Cindy, who
transmits it to Dharmuta‟s hard drive. . . . [T]he copyright owner whose
work traverses the Amalyah--Dharmuta chain has suffered trespass on its
“right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.”
Id.
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Accordingly, it would seem as though, simply by the nature of
digital downloads, licenses would be necessary in order for consumers to use copies in the way that they would have used CDs or cassettes. A CD can easily be moved from one location to another and
played from different players without infringing upon the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner.192 A digital file, however, requires the
file to be copied in order to play it on different machines, such as
another computer or a portable player.193 Absent licenses allowing
such reproduction and absent an application of the essential step defense, consumers would have to sell their entire hard drive if they
wanted to sell or share their music collection.194
If a license to the copyright was in fact granted along with a
transfer of ownership in the copies, the current Ninth Circuit would
simply call this a license and the owner of the copies would no longer
be deemed an owner.195 However, even if a court considered the possessor both an owner and a licensee, as permissible under § 202, it is
possible that the owner of the copies would not be able to exercise
ownership rights. The license at issue would likely serve to grant
rights under the copyright, such as reproduction, as well as contractually restrict some nonexclusive rights, such as resale and private
use of the copy.196
192
This statement is limited to the playing of CDs in stereo systems or on computers
without compressing the discs into an MP3 file.
Digital MP3 files are created through a process colloquially called “ripping.” Ripping software allows a computer owner to copy an audio
compact disk (“audio CD”) directly onto a computer‟s hard drive by
compressing the audio information on the CD into the MP3 format. The
MP3‟s compressed format allows for rapid transmission of digital audio
files from one computer to another by electronic mail or any other file
transfer protocol.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). This compression
is actually a violation of the copyright owner‟s exclusive right to reproduction. See Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Sydney Aaron Beckman,
From CD to MP3: Compression in the New Age of Technology Overlooked Infringement or
Fair Use?, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 469, 476 (2007) (discussing Apple‟s part in encouraging this
alleged infringement).
193
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E]. The copyright owner could further
include DRMs to ensure compliance with the agreement. See supra note 169.
194
See supra note 191; infra Part IV(A) (discussing proposed changes to the essential step
defense).
195
See Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010); F.B.T. Prods., LLC v.
Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010).
196
This is precisely what the agreement in Vernor did. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1104. The
court found these contractual restrictions to be indicative of a copyright license and wrongly
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Although not an infringement of the copyright, consumers
may still be unable to use the digital downloads as they would CDs or
cassettes due to the restrictions placed on them by the contractual
agreement. If consumers tried to sell their downloads, which they
would be entitled to do under the first sale doctrine, they may be
found in breach of contract for violating the terms of the agreement.197 Consequently, the rights belonging to possessors of copies
are limited, regardless of whether they are owners or licensees.
V.

AMENDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT: PROTECTING THE
RIGHTS OF OWNERS OF COPIES

Commentators are currently debating whether a digital first
sale doctrine exists under the current Copyright Act. Many believe,
as found above,198 that § 109 already applies to digital media, although its usefulness is limited without permission to reproduce.199
Thus, the most effective way to protect both the rights of owners of
authorized digital copies while continuing to protect the copyright
owners from piracy and infringement may be to amend the Copyright
Act.200
A.

Amending The Essential Step Defense

Congress considered amending the Act with respect to the
rights belonging to owners of copies when it enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”).201 While the first sale
barred ownership of the copy. Id. at 1111. With respect to digital downloads, most contractual agreements are in the form of “click-through agreements” and cannot be negotiated.
See, e.g., agreements cited supra note 4 (appearing in the form of a “click-through agreement” when first presented to the consumer).
197
See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 n.6 (“If Autodesk‟s transfer of [the software] copies to
CTA was a first sale, then CTA‟s resale of the software in violation of the SLA‟s terms
would be a breach of contract, but would not result in copyright liability.” (citing United
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977))).
198
See supra Part III(A).
199
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E].
200
See id.
201
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 104(a)(2), 112 Stat. 2860
(Note, 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117) (1998) (“The Register of Copyrights and the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce shall jointly evaluate--(1) the effects of the amendments made by this title and the development of electronic
commerce and associated technology on the operation of sections 109 and 117 of title 17,
United States Code; and (2) the relationship between existing and emergent technology and
the operation of sections 109 and 117 of title 17, United States Code.”). See 17 U.S.C. §§
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doctrine can be used to limit the copyright owner‟s right to distribution, the “essential step defense” limits the exclusive right to reproduction.202 The essential step defense states that the copying of a copyrighted software program by the owner of a copy is not
infringement if the copy is “created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and . . .
is used in no other manner.”203 Similar to the first sale doctrine, the
essential step defense requires ownership of the particular copy.204
However, this defense is limited in applicability to software and is
therefore of little use to owners of digital music downloads.205 Significantly, Congress did not elect to amend the defense‟s unnecessary
limitation to software after it enacted the DMCA.206
As noted with respect to the first sale doctrine, the tests used
by the Ninth Circuit to determine ownership often result in a finding
against first sales and thereby prevent use of owners‟ affirmative defenses when they should otherwise be allowed. Consequently, if a
court finds that a consumer does not own the copies of a software
program, the user is barred from protection under the essential step
defense.207 Absent terms in the license stating otherwise,208 the consumer would be unable, for example, to copy the program from the
purchased disc to a computer or back up a downloaded software program for purposes of archiving without infringing the copyright.209
The court in Vernor acknowledged the difficulty in limiting the use
of this defense to owners, but noted that, based on the specific language of the statute, it was Congress‟s intent to do so210:

109, 117, 1201; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E].
202
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 (“The exclusive distribution right is limited by the first sale
doctrine . . . . The exclusive reproduction right is limited within the software context by the
essential step defense . . . .”); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109, 117.
203
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) construed by Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1109; see also Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that, because the possessor of the
software copy exercised “sufficient incidents of ownership” to be considered the owner of
the copy, the use and modification of the software was protected by the essential step defense).
204
17 U.S.C. § 117; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 (restricting this defense to use by owners of
copies).
205
17 U.S.C. § 117; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107.
206
See 17 U.S.C. § 117.
207
See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112.
208
Id. at 1112 n.13.
209
See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
210
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112 & n.13 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)).
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It may seem intuitive that every lawful user of a copyrighted software program, whether they own their copies or are merely licensed to use them, should be entitled to an “essential step defense” that provides that
they do not infringe simply by using a computer program that they lawful acquired. However, . . . a licensee‟s right to use the software, including the right to
copy the software into RAM, is conferred by the terms
of its license agreement.211
In other words, the court assumes that the copyright owner
will grant to the consumer all rights that are “essential” to the utilization of the program, such as reproduction, just as the consumer would
have received under the essential step defense.212 If this were in fact
true, however, there would be no need for the essential step defense;
Congress could abandon this section of the Act and depend on copyright owners to voluntarily give all consumers the rights necessary to
use the copyrighted work. Instead, however, Congress found a need
to guarantee reproduction rights to owners of software copies when
such reproduction was essential, but has failed to grant similar protection to other classes of owners.213
The essential step defense was created as part of the Copyright Act of 1976 and has seen no major changes since.214 Now, in a
world of digital media where there is only a thin line between the
copy and the copyright, courts are simply ignoring the distinction,
failing to find a first sale and ownership of copies, and therefore denying consumers the ability to raise defenses such as the essential
step defense.215 Additionally, digital music downloads are being distributed through and controlled by software programs. For this reason, the essential step defense should apply equally to software programs and digital content, such as music downloads, so that
consumers do not need to rely on contractual agreements from the
copyright owners in order to be granted these “essential” rights. Of
course, such a protection for consumers of digital downloads would
211

Id. at 1112 n.13.
Id.
213
See 17 U.S.C. § 117.
214
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 302, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998). In 1998, subdivisions (c) and (d) were added, and titles were given to subdivisions
(a) and (b). See id.
215
See, e.g., Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-11.
212
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only be effective if courts return to a strict application of §§ 202 and
109, finding ownership of the copy when there has been an authorized distribution.216
B.

Amending the Fair Use Doctrine

Another potential source of protection for consumers comes
from the fair use doctrine.217 The fair use doctrine, like the first sale
doctrine and the essential step defense, serves “as an exception to the
exclusive rights of the copyright holder,” and thus fair use of the
copyright would not be an infringing use.218 It allows the public to
freely use a copyrighted work for purposes of “criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research,” “including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords.”219 Courts have
found that these uses “afford[] considerable „latitude for scholarship
and comment‟ ” as well as for parody.220 However, as previously
stated, a licensee‟s rights are expressly limited by the terms of the licensing agreement and, as a result, there may be greater difficulty
proving fair use.221 Notably, the fair use defense is not limited to
those with ownership of a copy; one who is a licensee or merely in
possession of the copy without owning it may raise this defense.222
Thus, regardless of the future of the Ninth Circuit decision regarding
the ownership of digitally downloaded copies, consumers will still be
216
If courts continue to find, as the Ninth Circuit has, that copyrighted works embodied in
digital forms cannot be sold but instead are licensed, the essential step defense will be inapplicable even to the software users it was written to protect, furthering the need to amend the
Act.
217
See 17 U.S.C. § 107; supra note 37.
218
17 U.S.C. § 107; Sony BMG Music Entm‟t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d. 217, 229
(D. Mass. 2009).
219
17 U.S.C. § 107.
220
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994)).
221
See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging the existence of a “contractual waiver of affirmative defenses” (citing United States v. Spector, 55 F.3d 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1995))).
222
See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2001).
The court held that users of the Napster software program “who upload[ed] file names to the
search index for others to copy violate[d] plaintiffs‟ distribution rights[ and] Napster users
who download[ed] files containing copyrighted music violate[d] plaintiffs‟ reproduction
rights.” Id. at 1014. Although these users possessed unauthorized copies, Napster asserted
that those users were fair users – a defense which was ultimately rejected by the court. Id. at
1014-15.
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able to assert a fair use defense, although they may be restricted if
there is a license accompanying the transaction.223
This determination is made by evaluating four factors laid out
by Congress, weighing the results together, and viewing them in light
of the purposes of copyright.224 These factors include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.225
Although fair use protects digital download consumers regardless of whether they own or merely possess the copies, courts
have already made clear that certain uses of digital downloads, such
as unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing, constitute copyright infringement and are not excepted by the fair use doctrine.226 In A&M
Records v. Napster, Inc.,227 the defendant software company asserted
that the consumers‟ use of the copyrighted works, accessed through
the Napster software, was “fair” and therefore non-infringing.228
Napster argued that it could not be held liable as secondary infringers
absent a direct infringer.229 The court had little difficulty finding that
“Napster does not facilitate infringement of the copyright laws in the
absence of direct infringement,”230 or that the acts of reproduction
and distribution by the software users constituted copyright infringe223

See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studio, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1983)
(holding that consumers‟ use of Sony‟s VCRs was fair where the VCR enabled consumers to
record television shows that were licensed for broadcast).
224
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576-77 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
225
17 U.S.C. § 107; see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th
Cir. 2001).
226
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
The Court in Grokster determined that there was no evidence of fair use by users of Grokster‟s or StreamCast‟s software. Id. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also Napster, 239
F.3d at 1014-15 (stating that Napster‟s peer-to-peer software does not fit within fair use).
227
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
228
Id. at 1014 (“Napster asserts an affirmative defense to the charge that its users directly
infringe plaintiffs‟ copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings.”).
229
Id. at 1013 n.2.
230
Id. (“Secondary liability for copyright infringement does not exist in the absence of
direct infringement by a third party.”).
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ment.231 Thus, the court was left to determine whether the use by
Napster‟s consumers was fair, and it did so by addressing each of the
four factors available in § 107.232
The first element, purpose and character of the use, examines
whether the work is “transformative,” as well as whether the work is
“commercial or noncommercial.”233 Digital downloads were found
to be non-transformative, as they were merely retransmitted copies of
the work in a different medium.234 A transformative use is more likely to be fair.235 Moreover, a noncommercial use weighs more towards a finding of fair use, although it is not dispositive.236 A finding
of commercial use, or “repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works,” does not require the sale of copies for profit, nor does
it require direct economic benefit to the owner of the copies.237 In
Napster, the court found that the digital downloads were being used
for commercial purposes because users would download the work to
spare the expense of purchasing authorized copies.238
The second element of fair use is the nature of the use.239 In
other words, “[w]orks that are creative in nature are „closer to the
core of intended copyright protection‟ than [the] more fact-based
works.”240 The fact that the musical compositions and the sound recordings were “creative” worked against the defendant in its fair use
defense.241
The third element reflects an analysis used to determine how
much of the copyrighted work was used.242 By engaging in
the “ „wholesale copying‟ of copyrighted work,” Napster users helped
231

Id. at 1014 (“We agree that plaintiffs have shown that Napster users infringe at least
two of the copyright holders‟ exclusive rights: the rights to reproduction, § 106(1); and distribution, § 106(3). Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to
copy violate the plaintiffs‟ distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing
copyrighted music violate plaintiffs‟ reproduction rights.”).
232
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-15 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
233
Id. at 1015 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 584-85
(1994)).
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85).
237
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
238
Id.
239
17 U.S.C. § 107.
240
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
586 (1994)).
241
Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
242
17 U.S.C. § 107.
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to weigh the evidence against fair use for the digital downloads.243
Finally, the court in Napster evaluated the effect of the use on
the market244 and found that Napster harmed the market in two
ways.245 First, downloaders were able to permissibly download, resulting in a reduction of audio CD sales.246 Second, the use of Napster‟s software raised copyright owners‟ barriers of entry into the
market of digital downloads, because consumers had the unauthorized Napster software as an option.247 Based on this negative effect
on the market, in combination with the court‟s prior analysis under
the fair use factor, the use of digital downloads in Napster did not fall
within fair use.248
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster249 that software distributors could be held liable for indirect infringement based on the infringing acts of its users,
implicitly finding that file sharing constitutes copyright infringement.250 First, the Court distinguished this case from Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,251 in which Sony was held
not liable for indirect infringement based on its distribution of the
VCR.252 In Sony, evidence revealed that the VCR was primarily used
for “ „time-shifting,‟ . . . which the Court found to be a fair, not an infringing, use.”253 Second, the Court noted the district court‟s holding
that “those who used the Grokster and Morpheus software to download copyrighted media files directly infringed MGM‟s copyrights,”
which was not disputed on appeal.254 Although the indirect infringers, rather than the direct infringers, were actually held liable, this
was likely based on the difficulty and impracticality of tracking down
243

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016 (“While „wholesale copying does not preclude fair use per
se,‟ copying an entire work „militates against a finding of fair use.‟ ” (quoting Worldwide
Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000))).
244
Id. at 1016-17.
245
Id. at 1016.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-18; see also Maverick Recording v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193,
197, 199 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding a teenager directly liable for peer-to-peer file sharing after
downloading various unauthorized sound recordings).
249
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
250
See id. at 929-30.
251
464 U.S. 417 (1983).
252
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931-32 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
253
Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 423-24).
254
Id. at 927.
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the direct infringers.255
Some courts have encouraged owners of copies to look to the
fair use doctrine, stating that courts should begin to interpret it more
broadly. In Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum,256 the
court stated that “file sharing for the purposes of sampling music
prior to purchase or space-shifting to store purchased music more efficiently might offer a compelling case for fair use.”257 Ultimately,
however, the court held against a fair use finding, because the defendant “mounted a broadside attack that would excuse all file sharing
for private enjoyment. It is a version of fair use so broad that it
would swallow the copyright protections that Congress created, defying both statute and precedent.”258 Evidently, this court may have
been willing to accept that some uses of digital downloads constitute
fair use albeit not all uses.
Based on these decisions and the four factors described above,
it is possible to distinguish illegal file sharing from the sharing of authorized copies, potentially allowing for protection of authorized copies under the fair use doctrine. The court in Napster held that peerto-peer file sharing was a commercial use because users of the software were downloading music to avoid the cost of purchasing authorized copies.259 Conversely, when consumers purchase copies from
online stores such as iTunes, they are purchasing authorized copies
from authorized distributors. Consumers must be able to copy these
files onto their own computers or media players to listen to the music
anywhere besides the machine on which the file was downloaded,
just as they would move a single CD or cassette to multiple players.
Arguably, use of one purchased copy in this way is noncommercial
and does not affect sales, despite its requiring reproduction of the
copy. Just as consumers would not buy separate CDs for their cars,
255

Id. at 929-30.
672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2009).
257
Id. at 220-21.
258
Id. at 221.
259
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). The court
also found that the sharing of digital downloads was not transformative, which is supported
by holdings which find that CDs compressed to MP3 files, despite the change in format, are
also non-transformative. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003).
However, a finding that a work is transformative is not required to hold that the use is protected by the fair use doctrine. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994) (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair
use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”).
256
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computers, and every stereo in their homes, digital download consumers should not be required to do the same, nor should they be required to rely on agreements from the distributors for such permission. When the sharing of authorized digital downloads is analyzed
under the four factors of fair use, two of the four factors are satisfied,
while none of the factors were satisfied with respect to illegal file
sharing.260 Therefore, courts should examine the fair use doctrine
more broadly with respect to digital downloads, or the legislature
should amend the fair use doctrine to draw a clearer distinction between illegal uses and authorized uses.
C.

Amending the DMCA Based on Fair Use

Other proponents of fair use have tried to argue, with little
success, that the DMCA is not intended to prohibit fair use, and
therefore, circumvention is permitted for such fair use purposes.261 In
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,262 the defendant, Corley, was
unsuccessful in raising a similar claim to prevent being enjoined from
posting a copy of a DVD decryption program on his website.263 He
argued that the DMCA provides that it shall not limit rights under fair
use, which should be interpreted to “allow the circumvention of encryption technology protecting copyrighted material” so long as the
material “will be put to „fair uses.‟ ”264 Further, Corley asserted that
an owner of a copy has the authorization from the copyright owner to
access the work, or, in the case of a DVD, to view it.265 Thus, when
the buyer is the one circumventing the encryption technology on the
disc, he is doing so simply to view it using a different DVD player.266
The court immediately rebutted both arguments.267 With respect to the first defense, the court stated that § 1201(c)(1) “simply
clarifies that the DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls
guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in circumvention
tools), but does not concern itself with the use of those materials after
260

See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1)).
262
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
263
Id. at 436, 459-60.
264
Id. at 443.
265
Id. at 444.
266
Id.
267
Corley, 273 F.3d at 443 & n.13.
261
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circumvention has occurred.”268 In other words, the DMCA is limited in scope in terms of what it aims to prevent, and thus, by its
very definition, does not interfere with fair use.269 With respect to the
defendant‟s second argument, the court noted that, regardless of
whether a copyright holder granted authority to use, view, or listen to
a work, such authority does not inherently imply authority to circumvent any encryptions.270 Rather, § 1201(a)(3)(A), the provision cited
by the defendants, exempts from liability only those people with authority to decrypt a protected DVD.271 Such authority does not come
from mere ownership of the copy.272
This decision indicates one of the major problems with the
DMCA – it requires a person to obtain permission from the copyright
owner, either through a license or by obtaining an unprotected copy
which the copyright owner has authorized, in order to exercise any
rights under the fair use doctrine. However, this directly conflicts
with the fair use doctrine because, by definition, any use under the
doctrine is non-infringing and does not require the permission of the
copyright owner.273 Consequently, DMCA should be amended, or at
least, more broadly interpreted by courts, to allow circumvention for
purposes of fair use.274 Absent permission from the copyright owner
or a change in the essential step defense, consumers of digital downloads, who wish to play their encrypted music on media players other
than the one on which it was purchased, must be able to circumvent
the protection without penalty. Although copyright owners may fear
an increased risk of piracy and infringement, they can use DRM to
track consumers‟ uses without limiting those uses, because a limitation may lead to consumers‟ inability to own the copies.
D.

Summary of Proposed Amendments

As long as the courts continue to interpret legislation against
the rights of the owners of copies, it is necessary to amend the Act in
268

Id. at 443.
See id.
270
Id. at 444.
271
Id.
272
See Corley, 273 F.3d at 444.
273
17 U.S.C. § 107.
274
See generally Devon Thurtle, A Proposed Quick Fix to the DMCA Overprotection
Problem That Even a Content Provider Could Love . . . Or at Least Live With, 28 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1057 (2005).
269
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order to clearly preserve rights such as the first sale doctrine, the essential step defense, and the fair use doctrine. As recently as September 2011, the Ninth Circuit revisited the first sale doctrine as applied to software in Apple, Inc. v. Psystar, Corp.275 and, consistent
with Vernor, held that the manufacturer-copyright owner licensed rather than sold its software program to its competitor through the use
of a software licensing agreement.276 In contrast to Vernor, the court
in Apple acknowledged the existence of agreements that are too restrictive, such as where copyright holders “us[e] the conditions to
stifle competition.”277 Although this concession is helpful in more
commercial cases between a manufacturer holding the copyright and
its competitors, it does little to help the average consumer who is not
purchasing software or digital downloads through software for purposes of competition.278 The legislature must step in to amend the
Act, prohibiting the overly restrictive licenses mentioned in Apple
and protecting the consumers.
With respect to digital downloads, it is important that consumers still be deemed owners based on a first sale standard rather
than the inevitable license that will accompany the required software.
Moreover, based on the nature of the technology, consumers of these
downloads must be able to make necessary reproductions of the copies and should be able to do so without relying on a license from the
copyright owner; this requires a change in the essential step defense.
Otherwise, and as in the current situation, consumers must obtain
permission from copyright owners to make reproductions, such as
copies for different rooms in the house or for the car, whereas transporting a CD from one‟s car to computer is acceptable. Obtaining all
rights through a contractual agreement vests a significant amount of
power in the copyright owner and may result in the consumer‟s inability to own the copy. In other words, the consumer would not be
entitled to ownership protections under the Copyright Act, simply because the nature of a digital download requires that the copyright
owner grant permission for uses such as reproductions. Thus, the
Copyright Act should be amended so that consumers of digital down275

658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1159-60.
277
Id. at 1159 (“The copyright misuse doctrine does not prohibit using conditions to control use of copyrighted material, but it does prevent copyright holders from using the conditions to stifle competition.”).
278
But see supra notes 169-70 (discussing piracy with respect to digital downloads and
DRM).
276
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loads are not required to obtain permission from copyright owners to
make necessary reproductions, which would otherwise be considered
fair uses. Finally, regardless of whether a court finds ownership in a
copy, consumers should not be prevented from using the product under the fair use doctrine as a result of DRM encrypted in the download.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Copyright protections and use restrictions placed on digital
copies have blurred the distinction between a consumer‟s ownership
of a material object embodying a copyright and a license to the copyright by use of the material object. Although a copy of the material
product is statutorily distinguishable from the copyright, consumers
who wish to purchase digital copies are often forced to agree to restrictive terms of use, purchase copies with encrypted protections, or
accept software license agreements. Further, consumers may only be
able to access their purchased digital content through related, licensed
software programs, granting the distributor yet another means to control the consumer‟s use. Thus, a consumer purchasing the digital version of an author‟s literary work is apparently no longer purchasing a
copy for ownership, but rather being granted a license. As a result,
consumers do not have many of the rights they once had and expected after purchasing music products, including use of the defenses
under the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense. The Copyright Act is no longer effective in providing consumers with such
ownership rights as digital media becomes increasingly ubiquitous.
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